The challenge of supererogation to the traditional conceptual mapping of the moral domain has been widely addressed by deontological and utilitarian theories but only lately by virtue ethics. The article examines the fundamental problems in accommodating supererogatory action in a virtue-based ethics as well as the claim that since such accommodation cannot be achieved, the category of supererogatory action should better be completely abandoned. The article defends supererogation as a significant deontic category which should be maintained but separated from judgements about virtuous dispositions, moral character and praise for the agent. It also calls for detaching supererogation from its original (Christian-based) association with heroism and saintliness which is deemed to be responsible for the confusion between supererogation and virtue. Since virtue ethics can hardly completely dispose of deontic terms, the challenge of supererogation remains real.
The unavoidability of deontic terms in virtue ethics
In a famous passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (1105a) 4 , Aristotle brings to our awareness the threat of circularity in the definition of just actions as the actions performed by the just person. We can become just only by doing just actions, but the genuinely just actions are only those performed by a just person, that is to say out of a certain character. This statement reminds us that Aristotle is on the one hand opposed to a purely agent-based ethics, yet on the other hand is committed to the primacy of character over action, at least in the moral sphere (the arts having a different conceptual structure).
So, on the one hand, action is not only necessary for the acquisition of virtue but also for eudaimonia , which is achieved through activity rather than through character alone (since character is in itself only disposition, i.e. mere potentiality). On the other hand, virtue is the ultimate standard or test of ethical behaviour and in that sense has priority over action in the circle mentioned above.
But can virtuous character or disposition serve as the criterion for right action?
Plato might be a candidate for holding such a radical version of virtue theory: virtues are signs of the harmony of the soul, of an inner psychological balance, of mental health. Interpreters of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean emphasize that virtue judgements must be according to Aristotle himself relativized to the particular circumstances in which the action or the feeling of the agent is assessed: the virtuous person feels anger or pity at the right time, with reference to the right people and about the right objects, etc.
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But how can this crucial rightness of feelings and actions be determined in virtue ethical terms when the whole point of the relativization is to regard the circumstances in the world as the object of judgement? Again, we must have prior, independent standards for who should be blamed for an offensive act or when such act should be tolerated or forgiven in order to judge the 'rightness' of our moral feeling of anger towards her.
So it seems that neither in Aristotle's view of virtue nor in modern virtue ethics can deontological considerations of justice or consequentialist considerations of overall utility be sidestepped. This, as we shall see in the next two sections, raises for virtue ethics the challenge of supererogation, since there might be actions that go even beyond what the virtuous person would characteristically do in a given situation.
The deontic distinction between duty and supererogation
Both Kantianism and utilitarianism have failed to give an account of supererogation (as noted by Urmson), although unlike virtue-based ethics they do not completely ignore it. In both Kant and Sidgwick we find attempts to somehow address the category of action beyond the call of duty. 11 These attempts attest to at least an implicit recognition (which does not exist in much of virtue ethics) that supererogation is a real challenge to any duty-based moral theory and hence must be tackled. My contention is that not only is the acknowledgement of a distinction between duty and supererogation imposed on deontological (and utilitarian) theories, but that the distinction finds its most natural explanation in terms of these theories.
Virtue ethicists have often accused the deontological conception of morality as being too 'juridical' and overly preoccupied with justice, contracts, promises, and rights.
In other words, it is too minimal in its scope of norms and gives priority to prohibitions of causing harm over positive duties to do good. Indeed it is true that social morality as it is often described in the last few decades is concerned with the minimal conditions of social co-existence, in the solution of game theoretic dilemmas, in the problem of trust in interpersonal interaction, in issues of cooperation and coordination, in the protection of rights and in contract-based political morality. Utilitarianism has also replaced its classical maximizing principle with a more minimal satisficing one. However, this image of morality is just apparent and it would be misleading to conflate deontological ethics with the law. Moral duty has always been understood in a much wider, positive and demanding way, which includes norms of care, the inculcation of justice, and assistance to the needy (even when they have no correlative right to it). The so-called 'imperfect duties' are of this non-juridical kind as has been most famously articulated by Kant. supererogatory acts are those which it is right (or good) to do but not wrong (or bad) not to do. 17 Michael Slote, for example, who represents the 'sentimentalist' theory of virtue, proposes on these lines that supererogatory acts are those which show 'an unusually high from that of liberality, magnificence being a virtue of only those who have a lot of money and are spending it in style. In that respect it is a sub-category of liberality, of the right disposition in behaviour related to money spending. But I am not sure that magnificence has a parallel sub-category in the field of actions related to danger, namely courage, and that there is an extra sub-category of courage that relates to people who have a particular natural or circumstantial property of being able to sacrifice their lives by throwing themselves on hand grenades. The reason is that unlike magnificence, the resources required for acting courageously are not external (like money) but internal (an acquired disposition) and hence an attainable (or morally required) goal for any human being. 17 I believe that there are such principles of 'exemption' from highly demanding standards of action but that they cannot be formulated in virtue ethical terms but only through drawing the line limiting duty as a deontic concept. Thus, failure to jump on an exploding hand grenade may often reflect exactly the lack of empathy (or better, for our analysis, the lack of courage) and be motivated by sheer instinctive self-regarding concern for physical survival (or fear) and hence cannot be said not to reflect the absence of a sentiment or a virtue. Empirically, it is the same limit of empathy (or courage) that causes people to avoid jumping on a grenade and jumping from a plane with a safe parachute. That is to say, lack of empathy or virtue cannot differentiate between supererogatory and obligatory action. The second problem in Kawall's account is that it is far from obvious that only virtuous observers can be ideal judges of what is supererogatory. We actually know from our experience that we can easily judge the act of throwing oneself on a hand grenade as supererogatory without having the least dispositional capacity (virtue) to do so ourselves.
You don't have to be a Mother Theresa to be capable of judging her behaviour as typically supererogatory and most people who are entrusted with the job of canonizing saints in the Catholic Church are not, and will never be, saints. Even if good moral judges are usually morally decent people, the perception of the limits of duty and the detection of actions that go beyond duty may better be entrusted to the decent rather than to the saints and heroes. The latter, just because of their extraordinary virtuous character, may turn out to be bad judges of supererogation since they typically modest and describe their own supererogatory action as duty! ('I just did what I felt I ought to do'). Kawall's suggestion conflates standards of judgement with standards of action.
So despite being sensitive to it, Kawall seems unable to remove the threat of circularity characteristic of all ideal observer theories. The derivation of the criteria for supererogation from the actual judgements of virtuous observers regarding supererogation leads Kawall to the counter-intuitive proposition that supererogation is a matter of degree: the more ideal observers judge an act to be supererogatory, the more supererogatory it is. And only the action which all ideal observers judge as supererogatory would actually be 'universally morally supererogatory'. 21 This conclusion is no less bizarre than deciding the truth of a scientific theory by a vote of members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Kawall is aware of the 'awkwardness' of his proposal but nevertheless maintains that supererogation is often a matter of degree. 21 Kawall, 189.
However, we should keep apart the normative disagreement about the boundaries of duty with the conceptual distinction between supererogation and duty. This distinction allows for no degrees in exactly the same way as the question whether an act is obligatory is not a matter of degree: it either is a duty or it is not -no matter how many people agree that it is (or is not). A woman is either pregnant or not, even when it is not easy do diagnose;
and the number of professional obstetricians diagnosing her as pregnant does not make her more or less pregnant.
Indeed, failure to act supererogatorily may sometimes cause a sense of guilt or shame in the agent, but as I have argued long ago, guilt is not in place is such cases since supererogatory action is defined as that action the omission of which is not morally wrong. Shame or a sense of disappointment with oneself may be rational in such omissions because they often are regarded by the agent as a failure to live up to certain moral ideals (or what is called, misleadingly, self-imposed duties). Kawall may be right that a person who never strives to attain moral ideals can be characterized as 'morally mediocre', but that does not imply any guilt in the strict sense, that which is associated with doing something that is morally wrong.
Denying supererogation as incompatible with virtue ethics
Rather than trying to revise virtue ethics so as to accommodate supererogatory action, a more radical solution to the tension between the deontic category of supererogation and the terms of virtue ethics is to deny the possibility of supererogation altogether. This is the line taken by Roger Crisp which will be examined in this section.
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Crisp, as we have already noted above, reads Aristotle as subjecting the concept of virtue to that of duty: the virtuous person will get angry when it is his duty to do so.
Aristotle, adds Crisp, is in that respect closer to Protestantism (which strongly denies the possibility of supererogation) than to Catholicism (in which supererogation has its historical foundations). And it is not only the soldier's duty to die for his country, as explicitly say). There is no way to go beyond duty because 'virtue is itself an excess of a kind'. the common weal, and every one would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of goods' (1169a). This sounds indeed a noble ideal for human society but it is doubtful whether it is coherent, for if everybody was willing to sacrifice one's life for the sake of others, there would be no 'others' left (as is clear in the company of soldiers standing beside an exploding hand grenade). And the same would apply to universal charity.
To that Crisp could answer (in the name of Aristotle) that some altruistic acts are not morally valuable and hence should not be considered noble or be a duty. Generosity, Crisp also makes the claim that, contrary to my defence of supererogation in terms of moral autonomy, a 'limited morality of duty' allows even for more autonomy than a morality of supererogation. For people are permitted to act unconstrained by moral considerations (such as being able and free to do a morally better act than they actually do). 25 But I think this is a mistaken understanding of autonomy, since choosing between two options that are morally neutral might indeed be unconstrained by moral considerations but such choice is also devoid of any moral meaning or value; whereas choosing between a morally neutral (permitted) action and a supererogatory one is of high moral value which lends autonomy a particular moral meaning. 
Metaethical methodological considerations
Like is often the case in genuine philosophical problems, there is no knockout argument in the debate about the very existence of a separate category of supererogatory action. Intuition about the issue is only a partial guide. The question ultimately concerns conceptual mapping rather than moral truth, for, as we have seen, duty and 'ought' are also theoretical terms which serve in different roles in different theories like deontology and virtue ethics. The case of supererogation is interesting since it is a concept which, at least until recent times, was uniquely Christian, or rather Roman-Catholic. But since it has gained some recognition in the last fifty years, there have been attempts to test its possible incorporation in various theories of ethics -first utilitarianism and Kantianism and then in virtue ethics. Virtue ethics has proven more resistant to the idea than the other two, although there have been quite a few consequentialists and deontologists who have either rejected it completely or given it only a subsidiary role (in terms that I called 'qualified supererogationism').
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This paper discussed various attempts to accommodate supererogation within virtue ethics and exposed the difficulties in doing so. Roger Crisp also reaches the conclusion that virtue ethics does not leave room for supererogation and grounds his view in a strong 'duty'-based reading of Aristotle. But here we reach a deadlock: Crisp believes that supererogation is a completely superfluous concept; I tend to come to the conclusion that the strong case for supererogation serves to expose a theoretical weakness of virtue ethics. I am intentionally cautious in the way I put it, since virtue ethics is a major ethical theory, covering most moral phenomena and appealing to a wide range of our moral ideas and intuitions and hence cannot be brushed aside just because it does not easily account for supererogatory action. Supererogation, despite its centrality in in our moral experience, is not a full blown theory of ethics and hence cannot in itself be considered as an ultimate test for the acceptability of virtue ethics. But still, despite this asymmetry, both Crisp's analysis and mine are a sort of reductio: if supererogation cannot be accounted for in virtue ethical terms, then, for Crisp, it is a reason to deny supererogation; alternatively, if this is the case, then from my point of view it is a strong argument against virtue ethics.
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Crisp argues that the concept of supererogation should be tested in terms of virtue ethics rather than the other way round since supererogation is a parochial concept (implying, of course, that virtue ethics is fundamental). Its sources are in the very particular and historically situated world view of Catholic Christianity and there is no reason why we should make any major change in our ethical theory so as to accommodate it. Despite the historical truth regarding the emergence of the concept of 27 Qualified supererogationism explains the category of supererogation in terms of satisficing (in contrast to maximizing) or in terms of what one is excused for not doing due to the difficulty of the act or the imperfection of human nature, or in terms of degrees of virtue or special vs. ordinary vocation, or -as suggested by Crisp -the toleration of people who cannot perform difficult obligatory actions. 28 A similar reductio argument is offered by Dreier, who distinguishes between ethical and rational satisficing, the latter being incompatible with supererogation. He consequently draws the conclusion that the idea of supererogation serves to justify ethical satisficing (and reject rational satisficing) rather than the other way round (namely, accepting rational satisficing and rejecting supererogation supererogation (which, unlike many fundamental concepts in ethical theory, is indeed a technical term), there is a methodological risk in this argument from parochialism. For parochialism is a matter of degree and to some extent virtue ethics itself can be similarly regarded as 'historically contingent' rather than universal (and indeed it has mostly been abandoned in modern ethics until its partial revival two or three decades ago). But the main doubt about the argument from parochialism is that there is absolutely no valid reason not to appeal to new concepts, even to invent names for normative categories and re-map conceptual schemes, when metaphysical and normative views about the world change. If supererogation is a parochial concept, so are the concepts of human rights, autonomy and toleration -all modern ways of organizing our normative views of the world which are much more recent and even less universal than supererogation. I bring these concepts as illustration for particularly important principles to which we are committed today despite our awareness that they are relatively new and have been adopted only by a small part of human cultures. We are sensitive to the way non-Western cultures often shun these concepts as not fitting their normative views, yet we find it hard and also superfluous to make an effort to relinquish them in favour of older, seemingly more universal concepts. The same, I believe, applies to supererogation.
Crisp is suspicious of such historically contingent concepts because he advises 'parsimony in normative theory'. He urges us to 'begin by assuming an empty world [of normative concepts] and then populate it only so far as is necessary'. 29 And he believes that in such a world, the concept of 'fitting' can do much of the work, as is the case in the proverbial example of what we ought to do when we see a suffering child whose pain we can relieve at no cost. Indeed, this case does not call for any complex theory of duty, moral value, right and wrong -let alone supererogation. 30 However the example is misleading since it is a typically rare case and does not reflect real-life moral dilemmas and choices in which judgement is not that straightforward and requires a much richer conceptual map. Methodologically, it is absurd to start from an idealized empty world and gradually build from the very thin concepts (such as 'fitting') a whole ethical theory. 29 Crisp, 29. 30 Although one can convincingly claim that the case already assumes a certain conception of 'cost', not to speak of the 'innocence' of the young child, including its exemption from responsibility and other concepts implied in the allegedly irreducible concept of 'fitting'.
For 'fitting' is already a concept saturated with thicker concepts such as the duty of someone filling a role or the universal empathy for those who suffer pain. Our moral experience is dense with thick concepts. Parsimony is a good guiding principle but conceptual maps should be rich enough for portraying the ethical terrain.
The problem of supererogation as an ethical category does not lie in its alleged parochiality but in its association with heroism. This is probably due to the religious sources of the concept in which supererogation was concerned with criteria of sainthood.
Being conceived in the dramatic terms of saints and heroes, supererogatory action has become closely associated with virtue, that is to say with a particularly strong moral character and an admirable disposition of self-sacrifice. However, once the concept is detached from its religious foundations, the door is opened to re-articulate supererogation as an ordinary deontic category, which although referring to necessarily praiseworthy action does often describe non-heroic, common actions such as making small gifts, making promises, forgiving minor offences, or lending assistance to friends or strangers. 31 Thirty years after writing 'On Saints and Heroes', Urmson, in a critique of R. M.
Hare, expresses 'regret' for having used the term 'supererogation' and for having suggested a 'new over-simple tetrachotomy' (replacing the traditional, deontic logical trichotomy). 32 His reason for this striking change of mind is that the adoption of supererogation in our conceptual map 'is to ignore the vast array of actions, having moral significance, which frequently are performed by persons who are far from being moral fine-tuned conceptual scheme for our moral language and for much thicker concepts (which, by the way, would go even farther in violating Crisp's parsimony principle discussed above), the thinner concept of supererogation would not be made superfluous.
There is something common between helping a lady across the street, lending a bag of flour to a neighbour and throwing oneself on a hand grenade (all Urmson's examples).
Even if it has nothing to do with virtue or special praise accorded to the agent, the common feature lies in their deontic status, in their optionality, agent discretion, and nonuniversalizable nature (what Urmson refers to as not being subjected to any Hare-like 'principle'). I therefore conclude that Urmson's regret should be ignored and his original conceptual mapping followed and developed.
Thus, back to the relation between supererogation and virtue, there is nothing particularly 'virtuous' in minor supererogatory action, on the one hand, and there are actions that are 'merely' obligatory that often reflect a particular virtue and justify special praise, on the other. The aretaic judgement should better be kept apart from the deontic status of the judged action, as should the assessment of the value of the consequences of action be from its deontic status. 33 Such less parsimonious mapping of ethical concepts 33 This is not to deny that in the overall evaluation of a person's life and character we do take into account a systematic avoidance of any supererogatory action as a moral defect of virtue, even if not a blameworthy one. See also Nancy Sherman, 'Commonsense and Uncommon Virtue', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988), 97-114. I would add that in the same way as we recoil from moral saints, so do we feel moral does more justice to the fundamental moral intuitions and experience which even if not universal characterizes the way we make moral judgements -at least in our own times and culture.
When I speak of 'our culture' I refer to a world view which is not only different from Aristotle's but equally from that of the Church Fathers who coined the term 'supererogation'. It is a pluralistic world in which we lost consensus about ethical role models which everyone should strive to imitate. It is accordingly a world in which ethical values cannot be imposed on people unless there is a special reason for doing so, such as securing social cooperation and cohesion, decency and justice. It is also a world in which the right and autonomy of individuals are taken as prior to what is best for all. Society and individuals are expected to tolerate those who strive to lead a life which is not evaluated as good as long as it does not directly harm others. We appreciate the personal choice of individuals beyond its 'objective' value and try to raise children who will ultimately choose their own life plans. These are all background moral beliefs that directly or less directly support the need and fruitfulness of a category of supererogation, a category which leaves room for objective judgements about the moral good but also respects individual personal autonomy.
In that respect, Urmson's revival of the old and unfashionable concept of supererogatory action is a reflection of a liberal view in moral life which is an extension of that view in the political sphere in which the right to do wrong (or at least not the maximal good) has been prevalent since the 17 th century. To virtue ethics such a view does not make sense and hence supererogation cannot be recognized by it, or properly explained in aretaic terms.
The Christian doctrine of supererogation was given a death blow in the times of the Reformation, partly because of its abuse by the Church in the corruptive practice of Indulgences and partly because it was incompatible with the Protestant view of divine grace. The modern, secularized idea of supererogation does not suffer from this bad reputation, and its theological connotations are nowadays limited to the story of the Good unease with people who fanatically confine their moral choices to their duties and rights, never deviating from them in a supererogatory way.
